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Introduction
The reform of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (cpp) in 1989 was an ambitious attempt to transplant adversarial normative principles within a legal system that had always been inquisitorial. This attempt quickly failed. Subsequent Acts of Parliament and decisions of the Constitutional Court substantially limited the adversarialism that had been introduced in 1989. The result is a criminal justice system that mixes some features of adversarialism with the inquisitorial tradition.
1 There is quite a rich academic literature discussing and analyzing this interesting blend of inquisitorial and adversarial normative principles. . 11 Yet, the nature of prosecutors' powers differs depending on the procedural context. For example, in England and Wales, prosecutors charge the suspect(s), can ask the police to carry out further investigative acts and decide 9 Ibid. p 23. 10 Ibid. p 81. The author asserts that one important question that comparative criminal justice can help to answer is: "Does the spreading of ideas and practices encouraged by globalisation reduce differences among systems of criminal justice?" 11 For example, in England and Wales, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Runciman) in 1993 and the Auld report in 2001 discussed how to improve co-operation between the police and prosecutors during the investigation. Despite the movement towards a procedural structure where there is a partial co-ordination between these agencies of crime control, prosecutors are still not involved in the investigation. This strict separation between investigation and prosecution aims at protecting prosecutors' independence and objectivity; and, ultimately, it should prevent abuses of power that can undermine the defendant's right to a fair trial (see, for example, RM White, 'Investigators and Prosecutors or, Desperately Seeking Scotland: Re-formulation of the 'Philips Principle '', (2006) Vol. 69 N. 2 MLR 143-182; and S Field, 'Judicial Supervision and the Pre-Trial Process', (1994) 21 Journal of Law and Society 119). Japan is another interesting example. Following the arrest of Tsunehiko Maeda, a very famous prosecutor who allegedly fabricated evidence, there has been significant concern over a serious deterioration in the quality of public prosecutors that can lead to abuse of power. Japanese prosecutor's extensive power is now under scrutiny and some have argued that their decisions need to be checked by greater judicial and media oversight (M Dickie, 'Calls for curbs on Japanese prosecutors' Financial Times (London 15 October 2010) available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/67f62b24-d875-11df-8e05-00144feabdc0.html accessed 27 October 2010).
whether to take over or discontinue a prosecution. But they do not have their hands on the investigation, leaving crucial 'gate-keeping' decisions to police officers who manage the investigation and can refuse to carry out further investigative activities that are thought necessary by the prosecutor. In Italy, the importance of prosecutors' decisions is emphasized by their power to conduct the investigation and to direct the police during the investigation.
There is however another reason why Italian prosecutors provide an interesting case study. The reform of the code of criminal procedure in 1989 was structural and, arguably, the most revolutionary modification was the abolition of the inquisitorial-style examining judge. In inquisitorial systems the accuser has a quasijudicial status. In particular, Jackson says that "prosecutors within the inquisitorial tradition have been more easily able to assume judicial status because they were born out of the separation of powers relating to prosecution and investigation which were all originally exercised by the judge alone". 12 Italy was not an exception and both prosecutors and judges had to act as impartial accusers. Today prosecution is monopolized by prosecutors but there are conflicting legal principles that make it quite difficult to understand their status in the criminal justice system. Grande adamantly argues that the criminal process is a dispute between parties, and prosecutors are a party to the proceedings under no duty to search for exculpatory evidence. 13 By contrast, prosecutors belong to the judiciary and, therefore, it is arguable that they have retained their quasi-judicial status that binds them to act as impartial investigators. conducted with prosecutors (27), police officers (11) and lawyers (11). Whilst some interviews were conducted in the centre and the south of Italy, the study is mainly focused on practice in the north and 10 prosecution offices were visited (along with lawyers and police officers working in the same area). 
Adversarialism in Italy
The adversary model is based on a system "in which procedural action is controlled by the parties and the adjudicator remains essentially passive"; 15 on the contrary in the inquest model the parties play a minimal role that is "subordinate to the court's function of finding the truth". 16 Today, it is no longer possible to grasp all the complexities of the different criminal justice systems by using the dichotomy accusatorial and inquisitorial. Consequently, a strict and clear categorization of contemporary criminal justice systems is not possible. Adversarial and inquisitorial are images which reflect a set of ideas and characteristics, but no criminal procedure system is, in practice, fully inquisitorial or adversarial. 17 Likewise it is important to 14 The size of the prosecution offices was variable going from very small to very large. Size was determined according to the number of prosecutors working in the office and taking into account the area for which the prosecution office has jurisdiction. From now on abbreviations will be used to indicate the interviewees. 
Adversarialism in Italy: the preliminary hearing
The prosecutor's decision to send the case to trial does not automatically lead to the last stage of the proceedings. Prior to the trial there is the preliminary hearing where the prosecutor's decision is reviewed by the preliminary hearing judge (giudice dell'udienza preliminare, gup) who cannot be the same judge that acted as gip during the investigation (art. 34 par 2 bis cpp).
Full evidentiary disclosure takes place before the preliminary hearing; and the defendant and his counsel can inspect the pre-trial dossier that has been developed by the prosecution (art. 419 para 2 cpp). Then, during the hearing, the prosecutor summarizes the results of the investigation with the aim of justifying the request to send the case to trial. In other words, the prosecutor will argue that the defendant must be tried because he or she is guilty of a crime(s). The parties can argue their case as well and the defendant can ask to be submitted to interrogation. Obviously, the counsel is entitled to present the results of the defence investigation. In practice, this is a trial where the evidence is presented on paper (i. e. the dossiers), so there are no witnesses and, consequently, there is no examination and cross-examination (but the 26 M Scaparone, 'Indagini preliminari e udienza preliminare', in Conso and Grevi (n 1) p. 526.
defendant can ask to be interviewed). At the end of the hearing the gup has three options: commit the case to trial, dismiss the case or inform the parties about the matters that still need to be addressed and investigated. But judicial activism is partially limited by the fact that the gup can only receive the additional evidence he deems necessary to decide whether to dismiss or send the case to trial. 27 In essence, the aim of the gup is to decide if is there is enough of a case to justify the proceedings being sent on for trial. If the gup decides so, the counsel's and the prosecutor's dossiers form the investigation file that can be used at trial. However, not all the evidence collected in the pre-trial phase can be included in the trial dossier (art 431 cpp). For example, pre-trial statements given by witnesses can only be included in the dossier if the parties agree. But the rule against hearsay is relaxed by other provisions of the cpp which, for example, allow the parties to use pre-trial statements in order to challenge the witness' reliability during examination and cross-examination (art. 500 cpp). Finally, the trial dossier also includes the record of any investigative acts that cannot be repeated during the trial, such as examination of DNA samples that may be altered by the examination process.
In the English criminal justice system, the committal for trial historically had a similar function to the preliminary hearing, but today the comparison is not accurate anymore. The committal for trial is now a formality and magistrates Courts only decide on either way triable offences (the offences that can be tried by the magistrates or the Crown Courts). Therefore, if the offence is one triable only on indictment, there is no committal for trial and the case goes straight to the Crown Court. So, as for the preliminary investigation, the major difference between the Italian semi-adversarial system and the English adversarial model of criminal process is the degree of judicial intervention. In England judges are required not to step into the dispute between parties, while in Italy judges still exercise a potentially great form of control over the pre-trial phase.
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27 Grande (n 3) p. 242. 28 Under section 69 of the Courts Act 2003, the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee is empowered to make Criminal Procedure Rules (by Statutory Instruments). These rules are created to ensure that criminal cases are dealt with by justly (Rule 1.1). In particular, they regulate, inter alia, the case management stage (Part 3, Rules 3.1-3.11), where the Court must actively manage the case (Rule 3.2). The court must, for example, establish, with the active assistance of the parties, what disputed issues they intend to explore (Rule 3.10); and may refuse to allow that party to introduce evidence if a party fails to comply with a rule or a direction issued by the Court (Rule 3.5). There is no possible comparison with judicial activism in Italy. The Criminal Procedure Rules are not designed to provide judicial scrutiny over prosecutors' decisions to dismiss or send a case to trial. However, it is interesting If the gup is convinced that there is enough evidence, the case is referred to trial. The trial hearing, more than any other stage of the criminal proceedings, is now envisaged in a form sharply contrasting with the previous inquisitorial model. In accordance with the common law tradition, there is a dispute between parties, evidence is produced to the judge in "its original form" 29 and, as a consequence, the importance of the pre-trial dossier is limited. The adjudicator is thus fully protected from the contamination of the pre-trial process. To emphasize that the trial was central to the Italian criminal justice system, the legislator introduced the principle of 'orality', whereby "no out-of-court previous statements should be read out in court for evidentiary purposes". 30 This is in fact the rule against hearsay. There are however exceptions to this party-controlled system that allow the parties to use pre-trial statements. And judicial activism is clearly visible because the judge can not only question witnesses at the end of the examination, but can also indicate to the parties issues that need to be addressed during the examination. Moreover, art. 507 cpp allows the judge, when absolutely necessary, to examine evidence under his supervision. This means that the judge can call and question witnesses and/or the parties; but he or she does not commission further investigative acts such as interception of communications and search and seizures. Grande argues that initially this provision was an exception, but that art 507 has been broadly interpreted by the courts "who have essentially thrown open a half-closed door".
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Finally, the architecture of the adversarial-style trial has been significantly dismantled by three decisions of the Constitutional Court in 1992. 32 These decisions extended the available opportunities to use out-of-court statements in order to increase the fact finders' capacity to find the truth. 33 The Court rejected the pivotal importance of the hearsay rule and stated that the criminal process must ensure that the truth is found by using, if necessary, the information included in the pre-trial dossier. This to note that these rules are now a part of the English criminal justice system, that is traditionally adversarial. general aim: to find the truth. Secondly, plea bargaining can only be applied if, after reduction, the sentence does not exceed 5 years of imprisonment and the reduction cannot be greater than one-third of the regular sentence. Thirdly, the bargain cannot involve the charges, because the legality principle requires that every crime is prosecuted. Finally, judicial activism is still alive. The judge, after examining the dossier, may reject the agreement and acquit the defendant; and the defendant can ask the judge to give him the one-third reduction when the prosecutor has rejected a proposed agreement. In this case the judge will examine the case and the reasons why the prosecutor did not authorize the deal with the defendant.
Plea bargaining was part of a number of abbreviated procedures that can be triggered if the parties consent. These were introduced to improve the efficiency of the legal system and to avoid the delays of the regular trial. Amongst these measures there is the giudizio abbreviato (abbreviated trial) that, in practice, stops the proceedings at the preliminary hearing stage. This is effectively the pre-1989 inquisitorial process whereby the judge decides on the pre-trial dossier. There is no examination or cross-examination, but defence counsel can argue on the basis of his own defence investigation. This confirms that the Italian legislator has not clearly chosen the adversarial ideal, but rather that there is a superimposition of two different systems. There has been no clear shift to the values and principles supporting the adversarial image of criminal process. Adversarial style procedural mechanisms have been added to an inquisitorial structure that has remained untouched or has been restored by the Constitutional court and post-1989 legislation. Italian criminal procedure could be dubbed semi-adversarial or semi-inquisitorial; but none of these definitions seems to be satisfactory if one wants to capture the professional and cultural values that underpin the Italian criminal justice system. As I turn to examine prosecutors' institutional role and functions in the context of this ambiguous criminal justice system, I begin to highlight these values.
Prosecutors and the Italian criminal justice system
Italian prosecutors are part of the judiciary and they are fully independent from the executive. 190/1970; n. 123/1971; n. 63/1972; n. 88/1991 and n. 96/1975. implications within the criminal process of the constitutional principle of equality before the law (art. 3).
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The reasons why the Italian constitution seeks to use the legality principle as a tool to protect prosecutors' full independence are mainly historical. During the Fascist era prosecutors were not part of the judiciary, but rather belonged to the executive, in particular to the Ministry of Justice which, for example, nominated and dismissed them. 42 They were an arm of a dictatorial regime, which widened their powers as defenders of public order. 43 Of course that public order was fascist in nature. Thus, the aim of the drafters of the 1948 Italian constitution was to re-design the system so that impartiality and equality before the law were not limited by any executive pressure. According to the Italian constitutional fathers, this aim could be achieved through a complete independence of the judiciary. A necessary corollary of this independence is the legality principle that legally prevents any form of discretion in relation to the decision to prosecute. Therefore: prosecutors are impartial because they belong to the judiciary; but impartiality can only be fully implemented if no other constitutional power (i.e. the executive) can impose criteria to define the offences that must be prosecuted.
Prosecutors' role and status are clearly ambiguous. There is a tension between different interpretations that are both rooted in legal principle. The confusion is caused, unsurprisingly, by the mix of adversarial and inquisitorial principles. Grande refers to prosecutors as the fourth power, alongside the judiciary, the legislature and the executive. This fourth power is not constricted in any way in practice, because although prosecutors are members of the judiciary, they are actually straight accusers and, more importantly, the legality principle is not applied in practice and, as a consequence, it allows prosecutors full discretion to choose the cases to prosecute. In The strength and the extent of the defendant's rights also need to be analyzed.
In the Italian criminal justice system the resourceful defendant has a very effective weapon: the prescrizione. This legal concept indicates that there is a limitation of actions. Prosecutors have a time limit to put forward the accusation. This is not fixed, but depends on the crime which has been committed: the more serious the crime 50 Grande (n 3) p. 241. 51 At its broadest 'defining the crime problem' has a sociological meaning which might be better captured by the phrase 'the social construction of crime' (see, for example, J Muncie, 'The Construction committed, the longer the time-limit (and some crimes can always be prosecuted).
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Limitation of actions can be very important in a country where criminal proceedings take on average six years. 56 In practice, the resourceful defendant will have a good lawyer whose main task is not to prove their client's innocence, but "to make the case overrun its allocated time". 57 Moreover, there are effectively three trials before the defendant is legally guilty. And there are no effective filters that prevent cases from being re-heard by the Court of Appeal and, on points of law, by the Corte di Cassazione (the equivalent of the Supreme Court in England).
If the defendant does not have resources the scenario may change and he could be tried using one of the special procedures, like plea-bargaining or the giudizio abbreviato. As explained, these are speedy trials aimed at dealing with cases as fast as possible and they are mainly used to tackle street crime (e.g. burglary, street robberies (i.e. mugging) and drug trafficking (i.e. pushing drugs in the street). In these cases the defendant does not enjoy all the rights that the ordinary trial ensures. For example, if the defendant opts for the giudizio abbreviato the criminal process ends at the preliminary hearing stage and, if he or she is convicted, the sentence is reduced by one-third. The giudizio dirrettissimo (very fast trial) has even more radical consequences on the defendant's rights. The cpp authorizes the prosecutor to use this speedy procedure when the defendant is caught in flagranza di reato, 58 or when he or she has confessed (i.e. the evidence is conclusive). If caught red-handed the defendant can be tried within 48 hours of arrest (but the prosecutor can wait for up to thirty days); during the same hearing the judge also verifies that the arrest was lawful. The decision to use this special procedure is taken by the prosecutor, the defendant cannot refuse but can opt for the giudizio abbreviato or plea-bargaining instead of the giudizio direttissimo. 55 The beginning of the trial does not stop time running. As happened in relation to some of the trials involving Italy's Prime Minister Berlusconi and many other important and less important cases, a criminal process can arrive, for example, at the court of appeal and then the judge stops the process because of prescrizione. In these situations the defendant(s) is de facto acquitted. He is not formally innocent and sometimes they are clearly guilty; but the defendant can no longer be prosecuted and/or tried for that crime. 56 C Nunziata, 'La Crisi del Processo Penale' (2004) http://www.lavoce.info/articoli/pagina952.html Accessed 28/05/10. The author points out that the statistics (up to 2004) include both ordinary criminal proceedings and those that follow a special very fast trial, like plea bargaining. This means that, in practice, an ordinary trial, that it is normally used for serious crimes like corruption, terrorism and organised crime, takes 9 years. 57 Nelken (n 7) p. 17. 58 In essence, this means that the defendant has been caught red handed.
Certainly these defendants cannot rely on prescrizione and these special procedures can have an impact on the efficiency of the criminal justice system. An efficient system can emphasize crime control and provide an effective tool to activate prosecutors' extensive powers. In other words, prosecutors could use these procedures to direct their powers towards certain defendants and to avoid the prescrizione. In this way, they implement their discretionary choices in relation to the crimes to prosecute.
However, even if we assume that these procedures are the first choice for prosecutors, there is no evidence that they have been particularly effective. The substantially increased since they started arriving in the 1990s. But the overall numbers tell us that the Italian system is less punitive compared to other countries.
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Prosecutors do not have sentencing powers, therefore the low prison population is not necessary a strong guide to prosecutorial power and discretion. But the conditions for an explosion of the prison population exist; and, assuming that, as Di Federico argues, prosecutors act as independent police officers, it seems logical that prosecutors would exploit these conditions to boost their uncontrolled powers and achieve the aim of obtaining more convictions. The low prison population, however, suggests that, on a factual level, prosecutors encounter obstacles that can moderate their uncontrolled discretion to interfere with citizens' lives. The Italian criminal justice system is, in practice, able to correct the imbalance between prosecutors and the defense. Prosecutors' status and powers must be put in the context of a very peculiar and complicated criminal justice system. Confusion causes lack of efficiency and, ultimately, this reduces prosecutors' crime control powers.
However, prosecutors might be powerful (i.e. the fourth power) but liberal, rather than powerful and punitive. In a similar vein, one can argue that the problem with prosecutors' enjoying unfettered discretionary powers is still potentially In practice, during the investigation the prosecutors' perspective is that of the judge because they want to build up a case that will stand scrutiny at trial.
It is true that prosecutors must support the accusation, but before doing that they have to act and think like judges. Prosecutors must ask themselves the same questions that judges ask themselves […] A good prosecutor must be the judge of himself and the judge of the case. If he solves the case, because he believes that the accused person(s) is guilty, he will support the accusation. However, before doing that he must be a judge. In fact, we do it [judging] when we decide to send the case to trial or to drop the accusation.
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When the prosecutor has to evaluate the evidence he must be like a judge. He must say if there is enough evidence to support the accusation during the trial.
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So, in general, when I prosecute, I try to think like a judge and to decide according to the evidence that the judge will probably have. This is because it is useless to begin a prosecution which will end with an acquittal. If I decide to prosecute a case, I always try to foresee what can happen.
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As explained, prosecutors' commitment to act professionally and culturally like judges does not protect their impartiality. Hence, during the pre-trial phase, prosecutors' legal culture primary effect is not to preserve neutrality, but to enable them to evaluate the evidence with enough judicial distance to anticipate a judge's reaction. This means to assess and increase the possibilities to obtain a conviction and, as a consequence, it can substantially help to have a better case. Prosecutors filter between the information generated by the investigation and the judge means that the aim is to render the judge impartial not the prosecutor (in the sense of deciding only on legal relevant information that has been properly obtained). In this way prosecutors try to achieve two objectives: a) to enable judges to make decisions on legally relevant evidence which has been properly obtained (if the case goes to court) and b) to enable prosecutors to predict whether there is a 'realistic likelihood' of conviction.
Despite the mere aspirational nature of prosecutors' neutrality, their judicial distance from the investigation generates consequences for the defendant's rights.
While prosecutors build up the trial dossier the aim is not to prepare for a dispute between parties, but to search and find the truth. 62, 63, 103, 195, 197, 203, 234, 240, 254, 270 and 271 cpp.) . Moreover, art. 189 cpp provides for any evidence which is not listed in code of criminal procedure. These pieces of evidence are not a priori inadmissible. The judge decides on a single case basis and the parties can put forward their arguments. In any case, the judge can not accept evidence if this is not directly related to the case (i.e. useful to establish the facts) and/or if this prejudices the morality of the person involved. In particular, this means that evidence can not be accepted if it can incapacitate (even if it is for a short period) a person (e.g. hypnosis). See V Grevi, 'Prove' in Conso and Grevi (ed) (n 1).
scrutiny at trial. 75 Whether this takes the form of a hands on or rather passive form of supervision, the defendant is protected by prosecutors' scrutiny of the case.
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However, cases can be prosecuted and tried using speedy procedures that enhance the routinization of the criminal process so that it may become an efficient crime control system to deal with crimes as fast as possible. As explained, this creates a sort of bifurcation (resourceful/not resourceful defendants) that can potentially lead to very different outcomes for criminal proceedings (e.g. trigger the prescrizione or not). But prosecutors also act as legal filters. Legal filtering applies to any case and, although it is mainly a passive form of review, it potentially protects defendants from prosecutions based on weak evidence. Moreover, prosecutors' professional culture and the sense of themselves as 'guardians of the law' create some sort of detachment from the police. Prosecutors adamantly claim their right to direct the investigation.
Although this does not ensure that a hands on form of judicial supervision will always take place; the cultural distance from the police enables prosecutors to influence the criminal proceedings from the beginning. 77 In essence, prosecutors are influenced by the information collected by the police, but their sense of themselves as official investigators creates sufficient distance to ensure that the case will be scrutinised on the basis of an effective process of legal normalization. It is obvious that prosecutors cannot be closely involved in all the investigations; and the more the prosecutor is ready to commit resources (primarily his or her time) the more the scenario that has just been described become a reality. But even a passive review of the investigation (i.e. legal filtering) leaves prosecutors in charge of some crucial decisions (e.g. is further investigation needed? Do I need to interview the accused person(s)? Etc.).
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These decisions are important to implement prosecutors' contribution to the investigation and to uphold the defendant's rights.
The reform in 1989 of the Italian criminal justice system does not seem to have created a "fourth power". As in every legal system, prosecutors have a crucial 75 On judicial supervision in Italy see Montana (n 36 
Legality Principle
There are various reasons why prosecutors' legal culture is insulated from the influences of adversarial principles. Some have already been outlined: independence, proximity to judges and a schizophrenic legal system. But it is prosecutors' vision of the legality principle and its impact in the criminal justice system that provide the key to an understanding of prosecutors' cultural resistance.
The faith that Italian prosecutors have in the legality principle is not affected by any of the common criticisms that one can make which question the extent to which the principle is reflected by practice. Even the interviewed prosecutors who admitted that there are ways of avoiding prosecuting or fully investigating certain cases which are not considered important, are firmly convinced that the legality principle is necessary because it will always ensure more equality than any form of controlled discretion. Moreover, in prosecutors' view there is no tension between the legality principle and priorities. In fact, the very nature of the legality principle does not concern when and how a case is dealt with by prosecutors; rather it implies that, sooner or later, the case will be dealt with. A chief prosecutor, who directed a medium to large prosecution office in the north of Italy, claims to have achieved the remarkable result that, in his prosecution office, there were no offences for which prosecution became impossible because of prescrizione. He explained this result as a fully effective application of the legality principle, with no concern for the fact that the files in the in the closet for too long there will be prescrizione. This is a de facto violation of the legality principle".
Italian prosecutors' strong belief in the legality principle reflects the aspirations of the constitutional fathers. One of the interviewed prosecutors talked about 'real' equality and independence that can only be achieved through the legality principle; he then emphatically added that this principle is "a cause of pride for this country [Italy]". Prosecutors are however aware of the difficulties that, in practice, the compulsory prosecution causes. In particular, they need to use resources for crimes that they consider very petty. One interviewed prosecutor summarised this very well:
"I am obliged to deal, in the same way, with neighbours who had an argument and insulted each other and with robbers". So, unsurprisingly, the problem is that there are too many cases to deal with and prosecutors do not have any power to close unimportant files without prosecution. Prosecutors propose different solutions to these problems: the organization of the prosecution office could be improved to find the best practices to deal with volume crimes; the government should pass legislation to provide more special procedures to deal with volume crimes faster and should provide more resources; and, more important, the parliament should pass legislation aimed at de-penalizing certain minor offences and introducing forms of diversion.
None of the interviewed prosecutors said that amending the legality principle is an option to solve the problems that the application of this principle causes. In general, there is a great resistance to solutions which imply substantial discretionary choices. Some interviewed prosecutors suggested that the legality principle could be partially moderated with the introduction of (more) legally defined exceptions, but it has to remain the basic principle. Some others accept that the parliament and/or very high ranking prosecutors and judges should be able to issue general guidelines on 79 D Nelken and ML Zanier, 'Tra norme e prassi: durata del processo penale e strategie degli operatori del diritto ' (2006) priorities. In one case one prosecutor even said that the Minister of Justice should be able to set guidelines; but he also specified that these guidelines should not constitute a "binding directive". In prosecutors' view, the guidelines should be persuasive, rather than binding. And they should merely concern how cases are prosecuted, rather than providing de facto exceptions to the legality principle. This is the only acceptable form of discretion.
So far, prosecutors' image of the legality principle has been analyzed. But why are prosecutors so adamant that this principle must remain enshrined in the Italian criminal justice system? Compulsory prosecution is a formal protection for prosecutors from suspicions or allegations of prosecuting a case for reasons other than the purely legal. Over the last 20 years, this has not prevented prosecutors from being accused of choosing political sensitive cases in order to persecute some political parties. However, the legality principle still provides a strong formal legal basis for prosecutors' actions. Legally it is very difficult to prove that prosecutors are serving political rather than merely legal interests. grasp the values that underpin contemporary criminal justice systems and to understand how procedural mechanisms work. Legal culture is central to this analysis, but, as I said, the aim is not that of a new taxonomy of criminal justice systems, rather to understand how these react to both internal and external influences. If one wants to explain and interpret contemporary criminal justice systems, it is necessary to pay attention to the differences between the 'law in books' and the 'law in action'. 83 And legal culture seems to be useful to explain if and why a distance between 'books' and 'action' is generated by legal actors' commitment to a certain legal tradition; and how and how far this commitment influences the practice. This is not by any means an invitation to insulate the study of modern criminal justice from the impact of socio- 
